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ARGUMENT 
In her brief Ms. Ekins makes several arguments which she claims invalidate her 
agreement to arbitrate this dispute. While the brief casts the arguments in several different ways, 
Ms. Ekins has raised the same issues raised before the trial court. Specifically, Ms. Ekins argues 
that the parties never agreed to arbitrate the instant dispute, that the agreement is unconscionable 
and that Wallace waived its right to arbitrate. For the reasons set forth below, Ms. Ekins' 
arguments lack merit. 
I. THE PARTIES ARBITRATION AGREEMENT APPLIES TO THIS 
DISPUTE. 
Ms. Ekins argues that the agreement to arbitrate is a narrow one that should be 
narrowly construed. Ms. Ekins cites Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 
P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that ambiguity in an arbitration clause should be 
construed against the drafter. 
In Docutel, the parties entered into a contract that provided for litigation of claims 
arising under credit agreements between the parties. However, another paragraph of the contract 
provided that "all disputes arising under this Agreement or pertaining in any manner to the 
dealership created by this Agreement shall be resolved by Arbitration by an Appeal Board. . . . " 
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds 
that the dispute before the court involved a "credit agreement" and was not covered by the 
arbitration provision. The trial court held that the specific provision regarding credit agreements 
took precedence over the arbitration clause and that arbitration of all claims was not required. 
1 
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On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court conceded that the contract was "not a model 
of clarity." Id. However, the court held that while ambiguities in an agreement are interpreted 
against the drafter, it is the policy of the Utah courts "to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner 
that favors arbitration." Id. The court further outlined the proper approach to construing the 
scope of arbitration clauses: 
'Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted 
when the issue contested is the scope of the clause. 
If the scope of an arbitration clause is debatable or 
reasonably in doubt, the clause should be construed 
in favor of arbitration. . . .' 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Ms. Ekins asks this Court to ignore Utah law and construe the scope of the 
arbitration provision narrowly. Ms. Ekins' arguments are not well taken when viewed in light of 
the undisputed facts. The arbitration agreement between Wallace and Ms. Ekins provides: 
In the event of any disagreement or dispute 
between Salesperson [Ms. Ekins] and other 
salesperson under contract with Broker which 
cannot be settled by and between the parties 
involved, such matter shall be decided by 
arbitration, and Broker and Salesperson agree to be 
bound by the terms and provisions of such 
decision. 
In October, 1995, Ms. Ekins signed a termination agreement with Wallace. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Exhibit "B." That agreement provides that commissions will be paid 
to Ms. Ekins for "transactions in process" only (also referred to as a pending transaction). The 
commission at issue in this case involves property located in the University of Utah's Research 
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Park ("Research Park"). Affidavit of David Jewkes, R.90 ff 5-6. Transactions regarding that 
property were listed on the termination agreement. Appellant's Opening Brief, Exhibit "B." The 
Termination Agreement also provides that it does not alter or change any provision of the 
Independent Contractor Agreement including the arbitration clause. 
Three months after signing the Termination Agreement, on January 16, 1996, Ms. 
Ekins wrote a letter to Wallace inquiring about the status of the Research Park transaction. A 
copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." On the same day, the landlord of the 
property in question responded in a letter that the transaction proposed by Ms. Ekins and listed in 
the Termination Agreement did not come "to fruition" and all "future proposals would need to be 
negotiated from scratch." A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." That letter 
indicated that all future negotiations regarding the Research Park property would involve Collin 
Perkins, a Wallace salesperson, rather than Ms. Ekins. Wallace sent a copy of this letter to Ms. 
Ekins on January 22, 1996. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." Ms. Ekins 
did not contact Wallace again regarding the Research Park transaction for over eight months 
after she had been informed that there was no pending transaction regarding Research Park. 
Ms. Ekins' first argument is that because she has sued Wallace rather than Mr. 
Perkins, the arbitration provision does not apply. However, it is clear that Wallace paid the 
commission claimed by Ms Ekins to Mr. Perkins, another Wallace salesperson, in early 
:/jdd/130672 3 
October 1996.l Affidavit of David Jewkes, R.91-92, t 18. Mr. Perkins has asserted to 
Wallace that he is entitled to that commission and all future commissions arising out of the 
Research Park transaction. Affidavit of David Jewkes, R.92, % 20. 
Knowing that this evidence is fatal to Ms. Ekins' desire to litigate this dispute, 
Ms. Ekins has attempted to exclude any evidence regarding demand for payment by Mr. Perkins 
and payments to Mr. Perkins by Wallace. In the lower court, Ms. Ekins sought to strike portions 
of the Affidavit of Davis Jewkes as hearsay. Ms. Ekins has renewed that argument asking this 
Court to exclude inadmissible evidence in order to decide this appeal. 
Ms. Ekins' hearsay argument misunderstands the hearsay rule. Rule 801(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c). It is well-established that when an out-of-court 
statement is offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is true, the 
statement is not proscribed by the hearsay rule. State v. Sorenson, 617 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 
1980); State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982). A statement that is offered for some 
purpose other than to prove its own truth is a "verbal act" and is not hearsay. Durfey v. Board of 
Education, 604 P.2d 480, 484-485 (Utah 1979). 
While not necessary for the disposition of this appeal, Wallace can easily argue under the doctrine of 
subrogation that having paid the commission to Perkins, Wallace is entitled to stand in his shoes and assert his 
rights against Ms. Ekins. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983, 
985 (Utah 1996) (defining subrogation as "'an equitable doctrine that allows a person or entity which pays the loss 
or satisfies the claim of another under a legally cognizable obligation or interest to step into the shoes of the other 
person and assert that person's right'" (citation omitted)). 
4 
:/jdd/130672 
In this case, the statements of Mr. Perkins are not offered to prove that he is 
entitled to the commissions in dispute. Rather, the statements are merely offered to prove that 
Mr. Perkins claims to be entitled to the commissions. As such, Mr. Perkins' statements are not 
offered for their truth and are not hearsay. Whether viewed in light of subrogation or Mr. 
Perkins' rights, it is clear that this is a dispute that falls within the intent of the arbitration 
provision.2 
Ms. Ekins next argues that even if this is a dispute among salespersons, it is not a 
dispute among current salespersons and a dispute of current salespersons is required under the 
arbitration agreement. Ms. Ekins misconstrues the agreement. The relevant provision states that 
"any disagreement or dispute between Salesperson [Ms. Ekins] and other salesperson under 
contract with Broker" shall be governed by arbitration. Nothing in this provision requires Ms. 
Ekins to be a "current" Wallace salesperson. 
Finally, Ms. Ekins argues that "she never received notice of any claim, demand, 
disagreement or dispute" that another Wallace salesperson asserted regarding the commissions at 
issue in this case. Brief of Appellee, P. 13. This argument misstates and ignores the facts. As 
stated above, Ms. Ekins has been on notice since January, 1996 regarding Mr. Perkins role in the 
Research Park transaction. 
2
 Viewing the Independent Contractor Agreement as a whole, it is clear that the intent of the arbitration provision 
is to prevent Wallace from having to pay a commission twice. This case involves exactly such a dispute. 
5 
:/jdd/130672 
Ms. Ekins semantic arguments that she has sued Wallace and has not sued another 
Wallace salesperson is without merit.3 As noted above, any argument regarding the scope of an 
arbitration clause should be construed in favor of arbitration. This Court should therefore hold 
that the arbitration agreement applies to this dispute. 
II. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE. 
Ms. Ekins further attempts to invalidate the Independent Contractor Agreement by 
arguing that it is unenforceable. Specifically, Ms. Ekins argues that the Agreement does not 
constitute a meeting of the minds, lacks mutuality and is unconscionable. A party seeking to 
have a contract set aside has the burden of proving that the contract in unenforceable. Sosa v. 
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361 (Utah 1996). 
A. THE PARTIES MUTUALLY ASSENTED TO THE AGREEMENT. 
Ms. Ekins argues that her agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable because the 
agreement references the Salesperson's Policies and Procedures Manual. Ms. Ekins argues that 
because she was unaware of the Manual's contents, she is not bound by the agreement to 
arbitrate. 
This argument overlooks the contractual principle that "parties may incorporate by 
reference into their contract the terms of some other document." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 299 
(1963). Indeed, as long as the reference to the extraneous document is clear and unequivocal in 
Ms. Ekins also asserts that the trial court found that the arbitration agreement does not apply to this case. 
However, a review of the complete record reveals that the trial judge made no such finding. Indeed, at one point 
in its ruling the court stated that "the agreement clearly applies." Transcript of Proceedings 29: 10-14. 
6 
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the contract, the document is incorporated into the contract. Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886 
P.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Furthermore, the parties need not know the terms of the 
incorporated document as long as the terms are "easily available to the contracting parties." Id. 
See also, Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Arbitration agreements frequently reference other documents rather than set forth 
all of the arbitration procedures in the contract itself. See, e.g., Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick 
Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1986). A contract that references the arbitration 
rules of the American Arbitration Association or National Association of Securities Dealers does 
not render the arbitration provision unenforceable. Id. 
In this case, Ms. Ekins has not established that the document referenced in the 
contract was unavailable. Ms. Ekins merely argues that she never read the incorporated rules 
and she is therefore not bound by them. Because she has failed to carry her burden of proving 
that the contract lacked mutual assent, Ms. Ekins should be bound by the agreement that she 
signed. 
B. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT LACK MUTUALITY. 
Ms. Ekins next argues that the arbitration agreement is void because it lacks 
mutuality of obligation. This argument lacks merit. 
Mutuality of obligation is an essential element of a contract. Ross v. Producers 
Mut. Ins. Co., 295 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah 1956). However, "a plea that a contract is defective in 
/jdd/130672 7 
this regard is really a statement that the contract lacks consideration." Id. In cases where lack of 
mutuality is raised as a defense to a contract, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the issue to 
be determined "is whether, considering the contract as a whole, the [party was] left without valid 
consideration for [its] promise." Id. (emphasis added). Whenever possible, a contract should be 
so construed that there are mutually binding promises on each party. Id. 
In Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951), the Utah Supreme 
Court examined a contract not to compete filed by the former employer of a pharmacist. The 
pharmacist argued that the covenant not to compete was void because it lacked mutuality. In 
holding the contract valid, the court held that "a contract does not lack mutuality merely because 
its terms are harsh or its obligations unequal, or because every obligation of one party is not met 
by an equivalent counter obligation of the other party." Id. at 825 (quoting Meurer Steel Barrel 
Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3rd Cir. 1924)). 
Ms. Ekins argues that because the arbitration provision does not specifically 
require Wallace to arbitrate any dispute, the agreement lacks mutuality. However, under the 
Independent Contractor Agreement Wallace was required to pay Ms. Ekins commissions and to 
provide her with an office, equipment and real estate listings. Wallace performed its obligations 
under the Agreement for over six years. Ms. Ekins cannot contend that the Independent 
Contractor Agreement, considered as a whole, lacks mutuality. 
:/jdd/130672 8 
C. THE AGREEMENT IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE. 
Ms. Ekins' final argument that the agreement is unenforceable is that its terms are 
unconscionable. Ms. Ekins contends that the provision requiring that the arbitrators be selected 
from among the salespersons working for Wallace lacks neutrality and renders the procedure 
unconscionable.4 
In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, courts consider whether "its 
terms [are] so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party" or whether there 
exists "an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain." Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985) (quoting Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 462 (Utah 1983)). 
In Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court 
examined a challenge similar to that raised by Ms. Ekins. In Sosa, a patient agreed to submit any 
malpractice claim against her orthopedic surgeon to arbitration. The agreement required that 
arbitration panel consist of neutrally selected orthopedic surgeons. When the patient filed a 
lawsuit, the surgeon moved to stay the litigation proceedings and compel arbitration under the 
agreement. The trial court held the provision to be unconscionable and refused to stay the 
litigation. 
The doctrine of unconscionability can be divided into two branches: procedural and substantive. Procedural 
unconscionability focuses on the formation of the agreement. Substantive unconscionability focuses on the 
agreement's contents. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 
1985). Ms. Ekins does not raise any issue regarding the formation of the agreement but limits her argument to the 
agreement's substance. 
9 
:/jdd/130672 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The court held that 
the patient had "not presented any evidence of likely bias-only assertion" and refused to find the 
provision unconscionable. 
This case is analogous to Sosa. The fact that the arbitrators are to be selected 
from among the independent contractors who are former colleagues of Ms. Ekins does not render 
the proceeding biased. None of the potential arbitrators have a pecuniary interest in the outcome 
and this Court should require more of a showing of bias than Ms. Ekins' assertion. 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to determine that the provision for selecting 
arbitrators is unconscionable, that does not render the Agreement unenforceable. In Sosa, the 
court held that an unconscionable provision does not render the entire agreement void. Rather, 
the Utah Supreme Court instructed the lower court to sever the unconscionable provision "and 
enforce the remainder of the agreement." Id. at 365. Accordingly, this Court should excise any 
unconscionable provision and compel the parties to arbitrate pursuant to their agreement.5 
III. WALLACE DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATE. 
Ms. Ekins finally argues that Wallace waived its contractual right to arbitrate by 
failing to set forth in its Answer an affirmative defense that this dispute is subject to arbitration. 
However it is well-settled that a party's failure to refer to an arbitration provision in its answer 
does not waive its right to arbitrate. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-5(2), (4) provides: "If no procedure [for appointment of arbitrators] is specified, or if 
the agreed method fails or cannot be followed for any reason, or if an arbitrator fails or is unable to act, any party 
to the arbitration agreement may move the court to appoint one or more arbitrators, as necessary. . . . Upon this 
motion, the court shall appoint the necessary arbitrators, whom the court shall find qualified to arbitrate the issues 
stated in the motion. 
10 
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460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), the United States Supreme Court examined the Federal Arbitration 
Act and held that any doubts concerning arbitrable issues "should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." 
In American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, 96 F.3d 88 (4th 
Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit examined a case where the party seeking to compel arbitration did 
not raise arbitration as a defense in its answer. The court held that because of the strong federal 
policy favoring arbitration, courts "will not lightly infer the circumstances constituting waiver" 
and the party opposing arbitration "bears the heavy burden of proving waiver." Id. at 95. 
(quoting Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court held 
that failure to raise arbitration as an affirmative defense does not constitute waiver. Id. at 96. 
See also, Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 982-983 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that failure to raise arbitration provision as affirmative defense did not waive right to 
arbitrate). 
Utah shares the federal policy favoring arbitration. The Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized "the strong public policy in favor of arbitration 'as an approved, practical 
and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.'" Chandler v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992) (quoting Robinson & Wells, P. C v. 
Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983)). Given the public policy in favor of arbitration, this 
Court should hold that the mere failure to raise arbitration as an affirmative defense does not 
constitute waiver. 
11 
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Furthermore, Ms. Ekins has suffered no prejudice as required by Chandler. Ms. 
Ekins alleged prejudice consists of receiving documents from Wallace and subpoenaing 
documents from a third party. All such documents will be as admissible in arbitration as they 
would be in formal litigation. Ms. Ekins also attempts to manufacture additional prejudice by 
citing the attorney's fees that she spent in filing a complaint and researching the case. Again, 
such preparation is not unique to litigation and simply does not amount to the prejudice required 
under Chandler. Because Wallace has not caused undue delay and Ms. Ekins has suffered no 
prejudice, Wallace has not waived its right to arbitrate. 
CONCLUSION 
Wallace and Ms. Ekins entered into an enforceable arbitration agreement that 
governs the dispute before this Court. Wallace has at no time waived that contractual right. 
Wallace therefore respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling and enter an 
order compelling the parties to arbitrate their dispute. 
DATED this I t ) day of April, 1998 
Jolm E. S. Robsdt 
JohiH^ Dunn 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
12 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1/0 day of April, 1998, I caused to be hand 
delivered two true and correct copies of foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to: 
James C. Swindler, Esq. 
Johnson & Hatch 
Suite 400 
10 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Tab A 
A 
L J J L V J T Business Properties 
" " " ^ GROUP LC. 
January 16,1996 Certified Mail 
Mr. David Jewkes 
Wallace Associates Business Properties Group 
165 South Main 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
RE: 410 CHIPETA WAY, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Dear David: 
This letter serves to confirm our conversation on January 9, 1996 regarding the 
consolidation of eight (8) separate lease agreements for the University of Utah at 410 
Chipeta Way. Below, please find an outline of the existing lease agreements in 
question and the terms of the new lease agreement which is presently out for the 
Tenant's signature. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH LEASE AGREEMENT (EXISTING): 
410 
CHIPETA 
WAY 
| SUITE # 1 
| 100 | 
I 156 
| 211 
| 213 
| 215 
| 219 
| 222 
I S-1 
I TOTALS 
U OF U DEPARTMENT 
U of U Cardiovascular #1 
U of U Coll. Of Medicine 
(Physiology) 
Poison Control 
U of U Lung Health 
U Med. Ctr Orthopedic Billing 
| U of U Cardiovascular #2 
| U of U SSRD/STACC 
I U of U Physiology-Storage 
RENTABLE 
SQ.FT. 
1ST LEVEL 
3,494 
24,855 
I 536 
| 28,885 
RENTABLE 
SQ. FT. 
2ND LEVEL 
13,184 
1,322 
2,845 
1,580 
| 3,615 
I 1.615 
| 24.161 
EXPIRATION 
DATE 
12/31/00 | 
4/24/97 I 
4/24/97 | 
7/31/96 | 
8/31/98 | 
3/31/97 | 
9/30/00 | 
1/31/97 I 
I 4/24/97 I 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Suite 1050 
Salt Lake Otv. Utah 84111-4904 
Office 801-355-2000 
Fax 801-355-8166 
Page 2 
NEW LEASE TERMS: 
Base Rental Rate: 
Lease Term: 
Base Rental Increase: 
Operating Expenses: 
$8.55 per rentable square foot, per annum, on a triple net 
lease basis. The above represents a blended lease rate 
for the first and second levels—See Schedule 1 attached. 
Ten (10) years. 
The Base Rental Rate as set forth above is subject to an 
increase at the expiration of the twelfth (12th) calendar 
month after the Lease Term commences, and on the 
expiration of each 12th calendar month thereafter. The 
base for computing the increase is the Consumer Price 
Index for all urban consumers (1984 = 100) with a minimum 
increase of three and one-half percent (3.5%) and a 
maximum increase of eight percent (8%). 
In addition to the Base Rental Rate, Tenant shall be 
responsible for its proportionate share of the Operating 
Expenses for the Building, which includes but is not limited 
to, utilities, property taxes, building insurance, and repairs 
and maintenance. Tenant's proportionate share is 
approximately 91.89%. 
Please note, the above Base Rental Rate represents an increase of approximately 60% 
greater than the old rental rate. This 60% increase also does not reflect the increase 
in revenues from an early renewal, as well as, the annual base rental increases. Also, 
there were no tenant concessions or tenant refurbishment allowances to be paid by 
BGK. 
The above lease terms, as also defined in the Lease Agreement out for signature, was 
only approved by BGK after a comprehensive analysis of each of the eight (8) lease 
agreements, and a thorough research and analysis of market lease comparables. 
Patricia Martin (Cheryl Willoughby's predecessor) and Ed Gilbert, both reviewed these 
terms, and had a complete understanding of reasons this transaction would be very 
profitable for BGK, and were motivated to bring the lease to execution. 
It is my understanding through your verbal communication, that BGK does not intend 
to complete this transaction, and has informed Wallace Associates to terminate the 
negotiations. 
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Accordingly, I consider myself released from my obligation to represent BGK*s interest 
without however, compromising my commission position in the event negotiations 
continue. Please let me know within five (5) business days if your understanding or 
their intentions are to the contrary. 
Sincerely, 
\jy«u{Lz&* 
Debra A. Ekins, CCIM 
Office Properties 
DAE/ps 
enclosures 
OEBRA/CHIPETAi.TR 
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SCHEDULE 1 
LEASE PROPOSAL 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
410CHIPETAWAY 
August 8,1994 
w w ^ ^ w "•F*P""*"WWmi"P"""P 
JJTE 
f & N f t t t g RENTABL CURRENT CURRENT PROPOSED ' PROPOSED RENTAt BASE 
SQ. FT- SQ. FT. COMMENCEMEN EXPIRATION COMMENCEMENT EXPIRATION RATE PER MONTHLY 
TENANT 1ST LEVEL 2ND LEVE DATE DATE DATE DATE SQ,FT, RENTAL 
100 U of U Cardiovascular #1 3,494 01/01/93 
U of U Coll. of Medicine (Physiology) 13,184 05/01/77 
213 U of U Lung Health 2,846 09/01/93 
219 U of U Cardiovascular HZ 3,615 09/25/92 
04/01/93 
12/31/95 
04/27/94 
Bliii 
08/31/98 
&s&&giKWi«N»!lij§& 
222 U of U Physiology-Storage 536 
^">$'%$Wi"&V>$f?.ff$":?v.?l?x< 
09/24/95 
•Hi 
04/24/97 
01/01/96 
i iliiil 
04/25/97 
09/01/98 
09/25/95 
04/26/97 
03/31/2007 
103/31/2007 
03/31/2007 
1^03/31/2007 
03/31/2007 
KHRiiF 
03/31/2007 
RHilli 
03/31/2007 
$6.60 $1,892.58 
$6.50 $13^63.13 
$11.00 $12,086.33 
11110111111111 
$11.00 $2,607.92 
$11.00 $3,313.75 
IliPiPlfiiiii 
$6.60 $290.33 
$37,793.62 
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BGK 
REALTY INC 
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January 16,1996 
Mr. Glenn Warnick 
University of Utah 
School of Medicine 
50 N. Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84132 
Re: 410 & 420 Chipeta Way 
Dear Mr. Warnick: 
I represent Research Park Associates who is the owner/landlord of the above 
referenced buildings. It has come to my attention that there may possibly be some 
confusion with respect to the various University of Utah leases located at these 
buildings and I wanted to dear up any misunderstandings. 
Last March, as you will probably recall, there was a lease proposal to consolidate 
all of the University of Utah leases into one masterlease. This offer expired April 
28,1995. There was still some effort to do something shortly after this deadline 
but nothing came to fruition. In addition the Cardiovascular #1 and #2 leases which 
were to be part of the original consolidation were renewed individually. Because 
of the expiration of the original proposal and the extreme time delay we consider 
any proposals void or terminated with regards to consolidating the leases. Any 
future proposals vvouldjrieed to be negotiated from scratch. __ 
The agent at the time who worked on these proposals was Debra Ekins who is now 
no longer with Wallace Associates and who no longer is our representative in any 
lease matters. Our authorized leasing agent with Wallace Associates is Collin 
Perkins and our authorized managing agent is Renee Schmid. 
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In addition, there has been some recent communication regarding where a lease 
amendment for Homeskilled Long Term of the University of Utah is. I am afraid I 
am perplexed by this as we have never agreed to a lease renewal for this entity 
and have never seen any proposed rates, etc. in connection with this. This is not 
to imply that we do not have a desire to renew the lease, only that we have never 
had any discussions regarding this. If this is something which was discussed 
between you and Ms. Ekins, it should not be construed as a pending transaction 
as it was never discussed with our office. 
Our authorized agent, Collin Perkins of Wallace Associates will be contacting you 
in the near future about your lease renewals. I sincerely apologize for any 
confusion that occurred during and after Oebra Ekins' transition from Wallace 
Associates. I hope you understand that because of her prior fiduciary 
responsibility as our agent, it would be unethical for her to remain involved in any 
future transaction with any existing tenant at these properties unless of course you 
desire to retain her and pay her directly as your Tenant representative. 
We appreciate the University of Utah as a tenant and we look forward to a long 
term relationship with the University. Should you have any questions please do 
not hesitate to call either Collin Perkins or Renee Schmid of Wallace Associates or 
myself directly. 
Sincerely, 
Cheryl S. Willoughby, CCIM 
Senior Vice President 
/csw 
TabC 
A S S O C I A T E 
January 22, 1996 
Ms. Debra Ekins, CCIM 
Business Properties Group, L.C. 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904 
Re: 410 Chipeta/University of Utah 
Dear Debra, 
I am in receipt of your letter dated January 16, 1996. 
I am forwarding, with this letter, a copy of a letter from BGK, received after our 
inquiry regarding the status of the subject negotiations. 
After my review of the attached letter from the client, I have concluded that there is 
not a pending transaction with BGK and the University of Utah. 
Respectfully, 
David L. Jewkes 
Wallace Associates Business 
Properties Group 
end. 
cc: Cheryl S. Willoughby, CCIM 
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